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The Moral Failure of
Clinical Legal Education
ROBERT CONDLIN

This paper discusses some undesirable effects of the "clinical" education
movement on the teaching of professional ethics in law school. Specifically
two questions are considered: (1) Why was clinical education expected
to be a superior means for teaching professional ethics to law students?
and (2) How well has that expectation been met? Section I defines
clinical education. Section II synopsizes the currently prevailing arguments for the superiority of clinical instruction in professional ethics.
Section III analyzes the theory of education that clinical instruction
presupposes, reports on empirical research about teacher-student behavior patterns in clinical instruction, and describes how those behavior
patterns could lead to the development in students of ethically questionable or inappropriate habits and beliefs. Section IV looks more
closely at the origins of clinical education in speculating about yvhy
clinical education has failed. Section V concludes with proposals for
reform.

I
Clinical legal education is defined typically as instruction in interpersonal
skills (e.g., interviewing, counseling, negotiation) and professional ethics
(the moral principles that regulate the behavior of lawyers in role) in
I am grateful to members of the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy's Working
Group on Legal Ethics for a spirited discussion of an outline of this paper. Additional
thanks are due to Rick Abel, Ken Abraham; Claudia Mills, Henry Shue, and Mark Spiegel
for their detailed comments. But most of all, I appreciate the help of David Luban. I did
not always agree with his comments quickly, but he persisted.
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the context of student fieldwork (representation of actual clients with
live cases in law offices created by law schools for this purpose) under
the supervision (systematic, critical analysis of student work) of a lawyer/
law teacher. 1 Each of the emphasized elements is important, and the
absence of any one weakens the claim that instruction is clinical. Most
clmical programs established during the last two decades follow this
model. 2
It must be added that a wide range of other types of practice-related
instructional programs are called "clinical." 3 These programs include:
practice court simulations of litigation (particularly trial) problems that
students are asked to act out; 4 ad hoc faculty-student research into
litigation and law practice skills; 5 extracurricular volunteer work for legal
aid offices, "public interest" organizations, and government agencies,
often called "internships"; 6 equivalent uncompensated (except through
course credit) work for private law firms, sometimes described as
"downtown seminars"; 7 practice-skill exercises grafted onto substantive
law courses and usually referred to as clinical components"; 8 and
classroom cognitive instruction (sometimes interdisciplinary and with
or without parallel simulation exercises) in the interpersonal processes
of law practice.9
Clinical education differs in two ways from apprenticeship training,
the form of lawyer education replaced at the end of the nineteenth
century by the university law school. 10 It looks for content more to the
interpersonal dimension of law practice-its psychology and ethics-than
to its administrative tasks (e.g., finding the courthouse); 11 and it gives
critical self-analysis of student work priority over the absolute quality
of that work. 12 This emphasis on psychological and ethical subject matter
and critical self-analysis has important practical consequences. For ex- •·
ample, students in clinical programs work on fewer cases, examine more
dimensions of their cases, and have less responsibility for initiating and
carrying on discussions about their work than did neophyte lawyers in
apprenticeship training. 13
Clinical education is also commonly described as a new teaching
methodology, the components of which are: "1) student assumption and
performance of recognized roles within the legal system; 2) teacher
reliance on this experience as a focal point for intellectual inquiry and
speculation; and 3) motivational tensions which arise out of ordering
the teaching-learning process in this way." 14 There is no doubt that
clinical instruction proceeds through this methodology. Whether the
methodology is new to law teaching is not so clear. The above elements
seem equally constitutive of the so-called "Socratic dialogue" -a firstyear law-school teaching method in which students take on the lawfirm associate role of intellectual apprentice and solve analytical puzzles
within a mentor's definition of a problem. The roles assumed in firstyear and clinical courses differ greatly, but the two teaching methodologies
are conceptually more alike than different. 15
II
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What seems most innovative about clinical study is its use of the
unstructured and multidimensional world of law practice as a setting,I6
· and its explicit consideration of interpersonal dynamics as a subject.
These attributes add a new set of questions and a rich new source of
data to the study of doctrine, policy, and analytical technique that have
heretofore made up the study of law.
Measured in volume of course offerings, clinical education has constituted the most substantial change in legal education in the last two
decades. 17 Starting from voluntary, unsupervised, extracurricular student
practice in the legal aid offices of a few law schools (e. g., Pennsylvania,
Denver, HarvardV 8 clinical education reached a high-water mark in
1977 when 139 law schools reported 494 programs of instruction set
in 57 substantive fields of law. 19 (The numbers for 1978 and 1979 are
roughly the same.) 2 From 1970 to 1976 alone, the number of schools
reporting clinical programs grew by 39 percent, the number of programs
by 192 percent, and the fields of law in which programs were offered
by 307 percent. 21 The number of law professors reporting clinical
education among their teaching interests in the Directory of Law Teachers
grew from 107 in 1971 to over 700 today. 22 In legal education, the 1970s
were the decade of the clinic.

°

II
The first question I would like to take up 1s this: Why was it expected
that clinical education would be a superior means of teaching professional
ethics to law students? 2 3
I shall begin with a typology of ethical problems faced by lawyers,
taken from Richard Wasserstrom. Vvasserstrom identifies two basic ethical
problems ·for lawyers: ~U}h~ J~YQQlt:r:El_~~L_!?~'l.l~ipulation-"that the [obligation of zealous representation triggered 15y1"-1h'e] ~la'Wyer-client relationship renders the lawyer at best systematically amoral and at worst
more than occasionally immoral in his or her dealings with the re~t of
mankind"; and-~a.LtJ;:g:_pr~~£1g_m ..QLQQlDl[lCit.~9f1:::-"that . . -: the lawyerclient relationship [itself] . . . is morally objectionable because it is a
relationship in which the lawyer dominates and in which the lawyer
typically, and perhaps inevitably, treats the client in both an impersonal
and a paternalistic fashion." 24 Wasserstrom sees these criticisms, if well
founded, as fundamentat and I agree. 25 They suggest, among other
things, that law practice involves treating both clients and third parties
instrumentally, that is, subordinating their personhood to the lawyer's
desires. They raise issues of whether professional expertise will be used
to restrict rather than enhance client autonomy 26 and abuse rather than
respect legitimate rights of third parties. Ironically, these issues receive
virtually no mention in the Code of Professional Responsibility_27 Yet,
as one commentator put it, "These are crucial matters with enormous
impact on law practice." 2 8
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Clinical education, it was believed, would confront these ethical
problems in two ways, one substantive and the other .methodological.
Substantively, clinical education would analyze the interpersonal skills
(e.g., interviewing, counseling, negotiation) of law practice. This substantive focus was supposed to make explicit the student's moral stance
toward clients and third parties and, in the words of one commentator,
· "compel the examination of personal ethics, morality and individual
conceptions of professional role." 29 In this view, ethical issues were seen
as !r:t~~-s.aE<!.~ly. ~~J:?~gg~g_jp t5?53.l1~s.-c5Ilnterpersonal tec1ui.ique :.
thought possible to consider questions of what ·would work, without
simultaneously considering questions of what was right.
· ·
This expectation was not farfetched. J:_l:J.~..s.l~sgJ!D.~J~ytwg~£1 ethis~
~0_9.~ts:J::.hniq_ll~iu___<;:.lini!:=al.~tpgy cap be seen in accounts of the nature
of clinical practice.

not

iE··y:ra.s·

Often becaus~ of the time the students spend in the research of their
problems, they come face to face with the possibility of using some
technical plea to win or delay a case. This gives the staff members an
opportunity to discuss with the students the lawyer/s responsibilities to
the client/ the public and the court in the use of technical pleas where
delay is the only thing that can be gained. If time is needed for factual
investigation or for better preparation of the case, discussion is had as to
whether or not a delay is proper through a technical plea. Is it proper to
use such where the purpose is to drag out the case to force a settlement? 30
Our experience with students in a clinical setting suggests ... a number
of troubling phenomena. . . . [T]hey experienced considerable difficulty
with their role as attorneys, and with the interpersonal, emotional dimensions of the problems they encountered. This went deeper than the
archetypal questions of professional responsibility courses/ e.g., Should I
defend a man who admits his guilt? Should I prosecute a man under a
statute with which I disagree? Should I allow a witness to testify when
I suspect that he is not telling the truth? These questions, of course/ were
present in abundance/ and generated the feeling common among practitioners that the people who wrote the rules never had to function under
them. What was also present/ however/ in far less resolvable form, were
questions totally ignored in the Code of Professional Responsibility and
in legal education. To what degree can or should I impose my judgments
on the client's perceptions? How do I control my fear, anger, and syJ:'!lpathy
for the client? To what degree are my judgments influenced by class, race,
and caste? In negotiating/ when does my manipulation of perception,
uncertainty, and attitude become "dishonesty," or go beyond the limits
of proper conduct?31

The link between technique and ethics also appears in the ostensibly
psychological literature in which clinical study is grounded. 32 The principal
clinical coursebook devotes one-third of its total pages exclusively to
discussions of professional ethics and professional responsibility, and
discussions of ethics and technique are intermingled freely throughout
the remainder of the book. 33 Similarly, textbooks about lawyer skills
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discuss both types of issues interchangeably to a lesser but still significant
degree. 34 One commentator even conceptualized the subject of professional responsibility in terms of a psychological taxonomy, suggesting
that the study of professional ethics was appropriately the study of the
internal psychological and emotional conflicts that ethical dilemmas
presented, 35 while anot_her called the "application of ethical canons to.
specific case:'i" a practical lawyering skill. 36
This blending of psychology and ethics in the clinical literature is
understandable. The ethicist and the psychologist often deal with the
same data and-·asFsimilar--queslions:37--Each ts····cortcerned --(in ·social
relationships) with divisions of power and responsibility, the limits and
uses of authority, the clarification and expression ··of values, the· issues
of do~ination and manipulation, and the enC:().tiia_geme!lt of autonomy
and free choice.
· ·
· ·· ' '
~en--the other hand, effectiveness, including effectiveness at psychological "technique," and goodness are not always the same, particularly
when relationships are multiparty (e.g., client-lawyer-adversary) and
obligations vary or even conflict. One person's effectiveness can be
another person's oppression._Qii].~QJJc;,ations... .pJQ.PE;D.§J!Y _to wor~
wit_h psycho1()gi~_al.__(~()Jl}~ ~~.SllJ.~ig~ .9f_P?Iitical and _philosophiCal)
con-cepts may prevent it from iden_tifying an~ cs)nsid~ringsucKpi9b~¢!?1-s, 38
· and prevent it from taking full advantage of factors such as the lawyer's
charaCter in directing and restraining lawyer behavior. 39
Perhaps even more important than this substantive approach to ethics,
clinical education confronts ethical issues methodologically as well:
clinical stu9,ents actually practice law. 40 Moral issues are thus raised in
ways that differ from those of traditional instruction in three crucial"
respects: (1) the issues are confronted in the first person, in the lawyer's
role, with ready-made motivational tensions-instead of Pi and Delta
and their lawyers, the parties are real and their lawyer is l; (2) the
problems appear in the full richness of a real-life factual situation; and
(3) all student work is done as part of a bilateral partnership with a
skilled practitioner/teacher, who models appropriate behavior at ,the
same time that he or she criticizes student performance. "'
The central feature of this process is its conscious use, both in theory
and practice, of the dynamics of role adjustment. This process generates
a number of epistemological and motivational consequences of enormous
importance. For example, "experience produces a qualitative change in
the mode and content of knowing, which cannot be replicated by the
transmission of information or the discussion of cases ... in a classroom.
The way in which ideas are understood after they have been used feels
different in a sense that is not fully explained by the fact that they are
more readily remembered." 41 This is particularly true of ideas about
values, much of whose content is lost when understood in a purely
intellectual way. 42
The process of role adjustment also triggers a need to know and
justify. The necessity of performing an unfamiliar task produces a strongly
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felt desire for some cognitive framework for coping with the anxiety
that unfamiliarity generates and giving consistency and coherence to
one's behavior. Since role adjustment is intimately tied to the student's
sense of self, the motivational energy generated by this need is very
high. 43
These epistemological and motivational consequences alter the teacherstudent relationship. To be sure, traditional law teachers are responsive
to student demands to be sources of competency, understanding, and
entertainment, yet few students formulate these demands critically,
concretely, and coherently. This freedom of faculty pronouncements from
critical scrutiny is in part attributable to the absence of any shared
teacher-student context or frame of reference within which criticism
could be formulated. Clinical teaching provides this context, in the form
of a shared law-practice world, in which students gain confidence,
knowledge, and critical perspective through performance with their
teach~rs of lawyer role tasks. This, in turn, increases student scrutiny
of faculty pronouncements. 44
In the same vein, clinical work requires choice and judgment to a
degree absent in other law-school instruction. Students are responsible
for the choices that are the subject of clinical teaching and must live
with the consequences in a way that makes the problem of responsibility
a meaningful concern. 45 As Meltsner and Schrag note:
Issues of professional responsibility ... loom large on the clinical agenda .
. . . Should they [the students] drown adversary litigators in a sea of
paperwork, lie to adversaries for bargaining advantage, or decide, as a
legal aid lawyer, to represent one type ofclient rather t0an another when
resources are too scarce to represent both? Clinical courses are superior
vehicles for sensitizing students to these issues, because the student must
actually make a choice among competing options. Unlike the student in
the classroom, he cannot stop after pointing out the risks and .costs inherent
in each available course of action, but must actually select one of them,
execute it, and incur the associated costs. His decision may well be
irreversible, and he will have to live with its consequences for weeks or
months thereafter. 4 6

Underlying the foregoing substantive and methodological points are
two foundational claims, one psychological and the other philosophical.
While infrequently voiced, these claims are in my opinion implicit in
any plausible argument for the superiority of clinical education for
teaching professional ethics.
The psychological claim grows out of the work of Erik Erikson 47 and
has to do with the way that adults develop values. The claim responds
to the sotto voce criticism of legal ethics courses that,~'qnly a fot:)l_w()uld
suggest that [a] law teacher CSJU~c:iJS'.h<:i.?.L;:l.J\>veptLye~r old liar or do
much else aoout'ln€t'Iundamental values which- his erl.vironm~nt has
.in:sfilled m h1rn.''48
--·' . '
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To some extent this criticism is valid. By the time a person reaches
the age of twenty, her or his personality is \Nell set. Yet, the development
of jden_~ity 49 _i.T1 __th~__ _tw~nt.t~JJ:Lcentury has_ underg~wnar7\.1an-st~
·callsa ''cruCial v:ariation.'.' 50 ou:r--·s-6C1~t.)(-proloftgs ·adoles-cen~e 'by:·ex:::-rending education, wJ:1j):h in. turn delays role commitments (such as
OCCUpatlo~af.chOlCe) at_tendant On adultstatUS.51 :rJi~s,· ·major partS of a
'persgn'$ _ident.ity_£I~.1~PL9J?.~PJ.2L~l!!.t~.AJQngc.t.~mt:}t is in
~ar-eas-including commitment to .and definitionoloq::l1pati()n?l~e>.les~that
professional ethics instruction can have a significant impact.
Because law s~~dents do not usually think explicitly about their roles
as la\!Vyer§, tbe d(C>yelop:rnen! ofJheir professionalj_cienti~y results largely
from emulation of role models-those who are respected, or in some
cases feared or hated; for their performance of lawyering roles _52 The
. nee~J2IQp.riatEL-m.o.d_els__~-jpJ~.D~gJ.y_j_~!_t, .§.£._g'!:~c11 so that. almost
··arlobservations of experts_ acting_in rol~s,,£Qtt\_~l}. __a[l9:-~~~f3?I,'J~~-:~sb9c:il; ·
will affect the pr6fessi6nar chara.·aei::'shaping of la_'Y" .§tudentst_Jhi.s. is
why ideas about _£I2L~£§i.QI1fiLbiliav:i.OLgath~:r.edi:t9rn·2E.9.:Stising la~s~
~d--law-iacillJf~e,_re~.graspe.d.oc.eagerly~and .. imi.tq.teci ..HYJS1h::,_~t:Y~~---~hen
suth practices border on the.,unethical.
· · · ·
·
Of all law-school instruction, clinical programs are designed best to
exploit the process of role-model emulation for teaching about professional
ethics. In observing ethically scrupulous lawyers acting in recognized
lawyer roles, students are required to make the fewest translations or
transpositions of instructional messages. They have an exact model of
the behavior they are to emulate. And they have an opportunity to try
out that new behavior under the observation of a skilled supervisor to
make whatever adjustments are necessary. Little coulct be done to improve'
upon such a design.
The foundational philosophical claim, which traces its roots to Aristotle,53 has to do with the way that virtue is known. Following Kelly, 54
I shall call it the "activist view." It holds that only someone who has
had the experience of acting in a certain way is capable of knowing
the principle embodied in that way of acting. Principles are arrived at
by reflection upon activities that have been experienced p:rereflectively
and internalized as dispositions.
A person learns virtues by imitating good people and good actions.
Critical reflection on what is learned, to articulate and harmonize habit
with principle, is an important but chronologically second step in the
process. The neophyte, who is being inculcated in virtue by imitating
virtuous acts, need not (and in fact cannot) be aware at first why it is
that the acts imitated are virtuous; rather it is enough to do them because
"good" people make her or him do them. After a while the habit of
acting in a good way becomes one's own. At this point the student of
virtue has made part of her or his moral potential a disposition, and
when he or she then reflects upon the nature of the good actions he
. or she can understand their virtuous character. Until disposition is
present, the moral character of action cannot be fully understood.

"lfiese·-·apen·

4
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The intellectual activity involved in moral matters is thus a kind of
practical wisdom, a capacity for judging particulars on the basis of
dispositions informed by deliberation. This faculty is what helps one to
decide what to do when different sorts of values that are not necessarily
commensurable all bear on the situation. 55 Because the content of moral
principles is not fixed independently of activity, however, without the
requisite experience even an intellectually gifted person is not capable
of knowing such principles.
If one believes in activist moral epistemology, it seems indisputable
that the clinic provides the ideal setting for the moral education of
lawyers. Only in clinics can students imitate the good actions of good
lawyers responding to moral conflicts and then reflect on their response
in the company of a good supervisor. And only by experiencing and
then reflecting on what it is to act correctly as a lawyer can they come
to understand and articulate a principled ethical viewpoint.
It should b.e apparent that the arguments for clinical instruction in
professional responsibility are arguments about potential, not results.
The arguments do not claim that existing clinical programs provide
superior instruction in professional ethics, just that such programs could,
if used properly. There is no hard evidence that students trained in
clinical programs behave more virtuously than students who have not
taken such courses. Even the first-person reports of student clinical
learning turn out to be remarkably unsubstantiated when examined
closely. The foregoing arguments taken as a group, however (since none
are mutually contradictory), make out a strong prima facie case for the
efficacy of clinical instruction in professional ethics.

III
This brings us to the second question: How well has the expectation
for clinical instruction in professional responsibility been met? This
question may be read in two ways. The first asks whether the ethical
content of clinical instruction has effectively taken hold. Do clinical
students behave in practice as they are instructed in the clinic? I do
not know the answer to this question and shall say nothing about it.
The second asks whether the content of clinical instruction ought to
be learned .. Do clinical teachers model behaviors that are ethically
admirable? To this question my answer is, "to a large extent, no." The
remainder of this section is an attempt to defend this answer, which
may surprise those who find convincing-as I do-the arguments of the
preceding section.
To begin, let us look more closely at the theory of education implicit
in the preceding section. It views clinical learning as a felicitous combination of two models, which may be described as "learning by doing"
and "learning by imitating." In the first model, the student practices
law, interacting with clients, adversaries, witnesses, judges, social workers,

The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education

325

etc. -call this group the "cast." The teacher observes these interactions
as an objective outsider and gives the student commentary. We may
represent this situation as follows (the solid line indicating interaction,
the broken line indicating observation):
"Learning by doing"
Teacher

I
I
Cast

t

-------+-

Student

In the second model, the teacher practices law (by intervening in the
student's cases, dividing the work with the student, etc.) while the
student looks on to see how it is done:
"Learning by imitating"
Student

I
I

t
Cast - - - - - - Teacher

Both of these models of learning are part of the Eriksonian and
activist approach in that they are two components of a process that
focuses on actual interactions as the vehicle for education. The problem
is that these two models stop halfway in applying this approach. They
assume that the actual interactions from which the student learns are
interactions with the cast. These models restrict their moral psychology
and epistemology to the solid arrows in the diagrams. What is omitted,
ironically enough, is the vast bulk of interactions between teacher and
student. The student engages with the cast only intermittently, but with
the teacher constantly. Thus, a better way to draw the diagram is this:
T

~

c------s

s~
c-----T

Like Poe's purloined letter, this fact is so obvious that it can be
invisible. But once we turn our attention to teacher-student interactions,
it is apparent that moral education in the clinic also derives from students
emulating their teachers' behavior in interactions with the student. In
effect, the student takes the place of the client and regards the teacher's
way of treating her or him as the sort of behavior in which a good
lawyer engages. 56 In addition to the content the teacher intends to
convey by analyzing the student's engagement with the cast, or by
engaging with the cast her or himself, the teacher's interactions with
the student also help to form the student's moral dispositions toward

.,
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the practice of law. And it is in this domain that clinical education
failsY
My views on this matter derive from the analysis of scores of hours
of taped supervisory sessions between clinical students and their teachers. 58
I was particularly struck by one feature of these interactions, namely,
that as pieces of behavior they themselves exemplified the patterns that
Wasserstrom identified as morally troubling. It began to look as though
clinical teachers and students differ from traditional law teachers and
students only in that they are even more zealous at modeling and
imitating dominating and manipulative behavior.
To demonstrate this, I must begin by sketching the view of ethics
that I presuppose. This view is drawn from the work of Jiirgen Habermas,
Richard Rorty, and Hannah Arendt. 59 Each of these philosophers emphasizes the close connection between the moral point of view and
dialogue. Moral reasoning aims at a certain universality; it attempts to
discover and ,..appeal to norms that are binding on all agents, in all
situations. To do this, one must develop the ability to "think ... from
the standpoint of somebody else." 60 Even solitary moral reasoning tries
to replicate in thought a dialogue among different points of view. Such
a dialogue aims at a rational consensus among uncoerced individuals
in speech situations minimally distorted by socially or psychologically
induced communication barriers. It imposes certain requirements on its
participants. They must make explicit to each other the nature of their
ends (which include affective reactions to practical situations) and their
plans for adapting available means to those ends. They must explore
ambiguities in, and articulate evaluative responses to, each other's
formulations, responses to those responses, and so on, until consensus
is achieved. 61
..
The purpose of this recursive communication process must not be to
win or to silence others. Its purpose is to understand and to produce
uncoerced agreement, if agreement is the appropriate outcome. Moral
discourse, in short, attempts to achieve consensus on the legitimacy of
ends and the rational relationship of ends to means (evaluating ends
and means in each other's lights) through a process of communication
that is public, bilateral, critical, and cooperative. In a previous article
I have discussed the cluster of behavioral characteristics that make up
such discourse under the rubric the "learning mode." 62
Now, it is noteworthy that observed discourse in clinical practice
instruction regularly had few of these characteristics. Clinical teachers
and students often competed over the authorship of ideas, concealed
their ends and plans for achieving them, attributed (without investigation)
meanings to others' ambiguous formulations, argued for preferences
subliminally and indirectly, suppressed strong but relevant feelings,
"protected" each other from difficult but necessary topics by ignoring
such topics altogefher, argued for beliefs in needlessly stylized and
hyperbolic ways, and feigned agreement to produce illusory consensus
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when underlying belief was the opposite. 63 Discourse of this sort is also
associated with a set of behavioral traits that I have called the //persuasion
mode. 064
At first glance, the persuasion mode seems to describe competitive
law-school styles of discourse previously identified. 65 However, the
behaviors I observed are different in some important respects. First,
persuasion-mode behaviors are more complex. It is not just that clinical
teachers and students act competitively and insensitively. 66 They also
tend to make decisions unilaterally, to keep their agendas private, to
dissociate themselves from responsibility for failure, to intellectualize
all questions, to argue coercively (if subtly so), and to seal themselves
off from data about their own ideological constraints and ineffectiveness.
These behavioral traits combine to form a self-contained and selfsustaining world in which all parts work in symbiotic relation with one
another. The ideology that these behaviors embody allows teachers and
students to agree with criticisms of law-school dialogue without realizing
that their own dialogue is among the objects of those criticisms. 67
Second, in themselves persuasion-mode behaviors are not always
inappropriate. Each of the behaviors has its place in law-teaching
relationships in which it is both effective and proper. The behaviors
are double-edged, however: when they are used in inappropriate settings
they do great damage. A competitive response to a bright and selfconfident student practicing verbal word-play spurs growth. The same
competitive response to an inarticulate and nervous student making her
or his first public statement has the opposite effect.
Third, the meaning one gives to persuasion-mode behaviors depends
very much on one's vantage point, and multiple vantage points exist.
Few teachers intend to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their
students; few are unfeeling; few compete over interpretations of work
product just to win. Yet many are perceived in these ways. Because of
the setting 68 almost anything that teachers and students say or do is
ambiguous. Each communication has several plausible meanings, ranging
from the most positive to the most negative. 69 The most common scenario
begins with a teacher statement intended as helpful but heard as an
attack. The student, concerned about being attacked, responds defensively.
The teacher does likewise, for the same reason, eventually creating the
reality of a joint attack, often from an initial situation of mutual
agreement. 70 The process of successive misinterpretation works slowly
and subtly, but to the ultimate effect of distorting discourse and producing
illusory consensus.
The problem underlying this process, shared in equally by teachers
and students, is communicative incompetence. 71 Neither teachers nor
students understand the complexity of the messages that they send.
Neither side hears its own words from the perspective of the other. The
other's inappropriate responses are taken as literally intended, rather
than as partly produced by plausible though erroneous constructions

,
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of the first person's remarks. The ultimate breakdown of dialogue is no
less real than if pursued intentionally, but perceptions of culpability are
different. Each side believes, with some justification, that it joins the
attack reluctantly and in self-defense. It is hard to say how these teachers
and students would respond if they were aware of their own role in
distorting instructional dialogue. But this response must be known in
order to evaluate their capacity for and interest in moral discourse.
Fourth, the persuasion mode is not always associated with bad,
unpleasant, aggressive behavior. The mode is just as often a low-visibility,
indirect, and even cordial method of manipulating others. A person
argues for outcomes that are "in the other person's best interest." That
they are also identical with the first person's desires is not acknowledged,
to either person. Nonverbal information corroborates the genuineness
of the first person's concern because, at one level, a persuasion-mode
actor convinces even her or himself of her or his identification with
the other. The persuasion mode is used among friends as well as enemies,
and people feel good about it as often as they feel resentful. Persuasionmode behavior can be overtly belligerent and aggressive, of course, and
in lawyers the mode is usually identified with these characteristics. But
the true test of persuasion-mode behavior is in what it seeks to accomplish
(e.g., victory rather than understanding or uncoerced agreement) and
by what strategies (e.g., private, unilateral, competitive, and self-sealing
actions rather than public, bilateral, cooperative, and self-reflective ones).
It is substance, not form, that gives the persuasion mode its identity.
It is understandable that clinical teachers would slip tacitly into a
persuasion-mode style. Clinical teachers, more even than traditional law
teachers, are charged with teaching "adversarial skills" 72 to students. 73 .,
They must train students to control conversation-by getting others
either to agree or not to disagree-until the ability becomes a reflex. In
other words, students must learn to convince others or silence them on
command, and teaching these skills is a necessary undertaking. In the
formal, stylized, rule-bound, and arms-length world of law practice,
doing justice in particular cases frequently requires the manipulation of
persons in whom decision power is reposed.
The most effective way to teach adversarial skills is by drill. Thus,
clinical teachers use such skills pervasively in conversations with students
in which real student interests are at stake. This encourages students
to protect their interests by responding in kind. The repetitiveness and
relentlessness of this process is what causes the skills to take hold. It
may be that for most clinical teachers this is not a consciously chosen
strategy. But its ubiquitousness in clinical instruction suggests that it is
a real strategy nonetheless.
In the clinical instruction that I studied, persuasion-mode behaviors
were learned unself-consciously, as a set of disembodied means, not as
part of a larger moral system that includes constraints on the use of
such means. Nor was the development of persuasion-mode habits
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tempered by the concurrent development of learning-mode habits. The
result of such unbalanced instruction can be morally disastrous.
The internalization of predominantly persuasion-mode habits can
cause a person to interpret most social relationships in persuasion-mode
terms. 74 This interpretation will produce few moral problems in relationships of strategic interaction 75 (e.g., zero-sum bargaining, courtroom
argument, witness examination) where the objective is known by all to
be instrumental success, but will produce moral chaos in relationships
of friendship, trust, and dependence (e.g., client interviewing and counseling, working with colleagues, witness preparation) where one side
expects to share power and responsibility while the other side moves
to seize them. The problem is one of teaching habits with limited and
specific uses as if they were appropriate responses to all law practice
relationships.
The following examples of persuasion-mode behaviors illustrate both
their beneficial effects in appropriate settings and harmful effects in
inappropriate ones.
1. A persuasion -mode actor assumes that meaning in communication
can and should be produced unilaterally, by attributing single meanings
to ambiguous statements. This assumption allows her or him to recast
adversary arguments into forms that are easier to rebut. But used in
nonadversarial relationships, the assumption demeans the importance
of colleagues and clients as necessary and unique contributors to the
knowing process, and encourages one to see these others as types rather
than persons.
2. The habit of taking charge, particularly by indirection and sub
rosa strategies, allows one to alter the direction of group action adverse
to one's interests while minimizing resistance to that alteration by not
letting on that that is being done. Yet, in client and colleague relationships,
habitually taking control can lead to paternalism and arrogance. It can
cause one to impute rather than explore others' ends, shut off rather
than encourage legitimate objection, ignore rather than raise debatable
but relevant issues, and accumulate rather than share decision-making
authority.
3. Persuasion-mode habits encourage one to see problems brought
to lawyers as technical, admitting of single, optimum solutions knowable
by experts. This disposition enables lawyers to plunge confidently into
complicated intellectual and emotional tangles between clients and
adversaries without fear that resolution is not possible. Frequently, this
sort of confidence, stemming from a belief that a technical answer exists,
would have aided clients and adversaries in their efforts to resolve the
problem by themselves. However, another consequence of a technical
world view is that the idiosyncratic, subjective value preferences of
clients are demeaned in choosing what ends to pursue and by what
means. 76 The result is that lawyers, as technical experts, often dominate
choice in ways that do not respect the moral autonomy of clients.
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4. Persuasion-mode habits cause a person to argue forcefully, hyperbolically, and at length. These are often useful traits in the courtroom
or at the bargaining table, but in assessment or planning sessions with
colleagues they diminish the importance of good reasoning. Similarly,
attributing meaning and forming evalu_ations quickly and automatically
are of value in the rapid-fire dialogue of the courtroom, but in lawoffice planning sessions where time is not of the essence, they produce
simplistic thinking. Complex phenomena are needlessly reduced to some
of their parts, and tentativeness and uncertainty are unnecessarily
suppressed. Persuasion-mode habits cause one to know where one stands
on an issue at the moment it is raised. But many moral questions need
not and cannot be so quickly resolved.
5. Persuasion-mode habits enable a person to minimize self-analysis
and to reserve it for private moments when it will not weaken instrumental
effectiveness. Successful argument in negotiation or trial requires the
speaker's own conviction in what is said, manifest in behavior and
demeanor as well as in words. 77 Self-analysis introduces doubt, tentativeness, and complexity all of which weaken conviction and the ability
to manifest it in self-serving answers. However, this same disposition
can also promote moral irresponsibility, for the persuasion-mode actor
avoids self-analysis of her or his own responsibility for the failure of
undertakings in relationships where candor is more important than
conviction. The self-sealing properties of persuasion-mode habits, however useful in bargaining and argument, reinforce this irresponsibility.
A persuasion-mode actor avoids acquiring a critical perspective on the
ideological properties of her or his moral stance. Thus, the inevitable
biases of class, sex, race, religion, region, and wealth embedded in the
actor's world view are more likely to be acted upon uncritically.
"'
6. Persuasion-mode habits predispose lawyers to take evaluative stands
automatically, as a first response to others' new ideas. This causes them
regularly to make statements that, on reflection, they know to be false.
Many of these statements will produce sizeable gains for both client
and lawyer (victory, authority, status, wealth), and the habit of taking
quick though erroneous stands can be predicted to produce continued
gains in the future. But the repeated experience of deriving benefit from
less-than-truthful statements may also wear down loyalty to accuracy
and fairness. Persuasion-mode habits may weaken one's general disposition to seek and speak the truth.
7. Finally, persuasion-mode habits cause one-understandably in competitive contexts-to hedge bets, cut losses, and pick winnable fights.
But such habits may inhibit bold moral action by encouraging one to
avoid risks. To be sure, calculated risks are often inherent in good
strategy. But to be moral one sometimes must stand on principles unlikely
to win competitive success, and sometimes take a stand when competitive
success is out of the question. Because a person with persuasion-mode
habits tries to be secure in her or his choices, autonomous moral action
often may be impossible.
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These attributes, taken together, make up a kind of instrumental
morality that causes a persuasion-mode actor to define interactions as
competitive and, above all else, to value winning and fear losing. Positive
legal rules are the only check on such a person's behavior, morality is
collapsed into legality, and maximizing to the limits of one's constraints
is the operative moral code. 78 These problems, again, arise not with
persuasion-mode habits in their own right, but with such habits learned
as disembodied means in isolation from some larger moral system.
Unfortunately this was the very pattern that troubled me in my analysis
of clinical teacher-student interaction. 79
A final qualification is in order. Clinical students' reasons for using
the persuasion mode differed .from those of their teachers, and these
differences suggest that teachers are more responsible for the present
state of affairs. Students are concerned about performing well in their
new role of lawyer. The psychological dynamics of role adjustment make
this concern inescapable. Clinical practice is as close as most students
get in law school /to acting in lawyer role. In this practice, the student's
standard for how he or she measures up is the clinical teacher. These
factors combine to make the teacher's behavior a powerful influence on
students' beliefs about how they should act.
There seems to be a threshold period in which the student, following
the teacher's suggestions, defines "performing well" as using effective
interpersonal technique. Effective technique, as we have seen, means
being reflexively good at manipulating interpersonal exchanges. Students
practice manipulation, often enthusiastically, not because they enjoy or
believe in it (some no doubt do, but many do not), but because they
want to learn to be effective lawyers and manipulation is what their
teachers have told them effective lawyering is all about. The students
do not know whether the teacher is right and must either take her or
his direction on faith (for the moment) or argue against it. The cost to
the student of arguing, at this stage of development, is substantial; he
or she will probably lose the argument and in the process also forgo
the opportunity to learn as much as possible about fundamental processes
of law practice, at a time when it is easiest to learn. This learning can
give either a more sophisticated and defensible understanding of what
is wrong with the teacher's conception of law practice, or a thorough
grounding in a conception of a professional role that the student ultimately
accepts. There is a logic to taking the teacher's direction and waiting
to criticize. I suspect, also, that most students wait because they believe
that they will not be sucked in, that is, that they will not lose their
critical moral perspective. This judgment is wrong more often than it
is right, but it is not usually wrongly motivated.
Two other factors play a role in a differential assessment of studentteacher responsibility. In this threshold learning period students are poor
manipulators. They are not yet skilled at the process and their sentiments
intrude. The effect often is that clients (or others with whom the students
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interact) are not so much oppressed as amused. Moreover, the students
do not benefit significantly in a material way from their manipulative
labors. They are given little individual authority (all work must still be
reviewed, every action cleared in advance) and reap no economic return.
They remain as ·poor, or poorer, at the end of the semester as at the
beginning (even in the search for jobs-clinical experience is of questionable value on a resume), irrespective of how well they manipulate
others.
I do not suggest that the lack of mean spirit, ability to manipulate
effectively, and economic return insulate a clinical student from immoral
action; just that these factors make a student's manipulative action
morally different from that of a teacher who no longer wonders whether
he or she is competent, who manipulates skillfully, who has achieved
significant status as a consequence, and who has had adequate opportunity
(usually not taken) to discover that manipulation is not always the
morally best,.course. It seems easier to say that the teacher should have
known the nature of her or his action, and that he or she has chosen
a course of action because he or she values it for itself and for what
it produces. This is not to say that the environmental pressure to
manipulate is weaker on the teacher than on the student only that
there is a plausible explanation of the student's behavior-it is a decision
to learn and grow-that is not present in the case of the teacher.

IV
If my analysis is correct, it raises another question: How could an
instructional program committed to the responsible, bilateraL and critical •.
study of ethics end up proceeding by passive, subliminaL and manipulative technique? To answer this question it is necessary to look more
closely at the origins of clinical education.
Clinical education did not start primarily as an educational reform. 80
It was not the product of an insight about law-school instruction, and
it did not originate with persons knowledgeable about or particularly
concerned with education. 81 It started as a movement for social reform.
Legal educators happened to be caught in its net because they seemed
at fault for not correcting the serious social harms that the legal system
produced and because they and their students were a major untapped
resource in the movement for reform. 82 Only later was the inadequacy
of legal education in ethics seen as part of the problem.
The clinical revolution started in the 1960s and 1970s with money
from the Ford Foundation channeled through a series of grant-making
agencies. 83 Between 1963 and 1978, Ford funded programs of every
size, shape, and substantive law orientation at almost all law schools
that asked for them. The purpose for which these clinics were funded
changed subtly over the years, even though the stated purpose remained
the same-the support of law-school instruction in "professional re-
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sponsibility." //Professional responsibility" would turn out to be a slippery
term.
In the early years of its funding of clinics, Ford defined professional
responsibility as consisting in "the distribution of ... legal services to
all segments of the public including the poor," and the bringing about
of "legal and social reform." 84 Instruction in professional ethics (i.e.,
the moral norms that regulate the personal relationships of law practice)
was recognized as a subsidiary goaL but systemic political reform was
emphasized. 85
The National Council on Legal Clinics, Ford's first grantee, was an
administrative creation of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA), to whom the grant was in effect made. 86 The money
was used to support law students who worked as clerks in legal aid
offices; interns in juvenile and family courts; and observers in mental
hospitals, social agencies, and police departments. 87 The purpose of this
grant seems to have been to help NLADA in its beleaguered efforts to
provide free legal representation (mostly criminal defense) to indigents. 88
The right to counsel in criminal cases was being expanded and the
demand for representation by indigent criminal defendants outstripped
the supply of free defense counsel. 89 Clinical students were seen as a
resource in NLADA's efforts to meet this demand through both the
students' specific clinical contributions and the predicted increase in
volunteer representation by lawyers who would have been "sensitized"
to poor people's problems by clinical programs. 90
In this emphasis Ford was only mirroring popular opinion. The period
in which clinics proliferated was the period of the civil rights movement
and the "War on Poverty." The politicaL social, and legal temper of
the times was reformist. There was widespread belief, not without cause,
in the reformist powers of law and lawyers. 91 Ford believed that law
students who worked in the legal system and saw first-hand the difficulties
that the system visited upon the poor would, as a result, work for
substantive law reforms. 92 Legal clinics were seen primarily as a means
to this social end rather than as a vehicle for the reform oj instruction
in professional ethics.
Law schools proved receptive to this educational innovation. The
changing temper of the times challenged traditional conceptions of the
role of the lawyer and of the law school. 93 Prominent psychiatrists on
law faculties and articulate junior faculty discussed legal education's
dehumanizing tendencies at (sometimes great) length in scholarly journals. 94 Legal education, it was charged, had to become more "relevant,"
personal, humane, and egalitarian. The classroom dialogue process was
criticized as excessively theoretical, abstract, intellectualized, and hierarchical, and law prof~ssors were attacked for being smug, impersonal,
sadistic, and hostile. 9 5
Law faculty reaction to these criticisms was varied. Some professors
had no immediate response and, after a few belated defenses of the
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old order, withdrew from the debate. 96 A few never participated. Many
disagreed with the criticisms of law schools, and even more regarded
the proposed clinical reform as intellectually shoddy and faddish.9 7 But
eventually the largest number of law teachers agreed that something
needed to be done. 98 They viewed the second and third years of legal
instruction as generally unsatisfactory and were willing to experiment
with programs that showed promise. 99
Clinical education came to be viewed as such a program. Work on
"real" cases, it was argued, would make "abstract theorizing" relevant 100
and the need for analytical skills obvious, and thus have ripple effects
in traditional law courses. Responsibility for client problems and a oneto-one relationship with a teacher would encourage a bilateral expression
and investigation of feelings as well as ideas, and thus make law study
more egalitarian and personal. 101 "Learning by doing" would reduce
the difficulty of motivating students to learn and thus make law study
more fun. Al1 of these arguments had obvious appeal.
It also helped that no other proposal for legal educational reform
was as suited to the times. The movement for interdisciplinary law
study had peaked for law and psychology 102 and had not yet caught
on for law and economics. 103 The most substantial interdisciplinaryeffort,
the policy sciences movement, popular at some elite law schools-notably
Yale-in the 1940s and 50s, had proved too remote from the day-today practice concerns of most law teachers and students to command
broad-based support. Besides, these programs were vulnerable to the
same epithets-"irrelevant/' "theoretical/' "impersonal" -leveled at traditionallaw teaching. 104 And Ford was willing to foot the bill for clinical
teaching.
A concern with systemic reform continued to dominate Ford's definition.of professional responsibility through the life of the Council on Education
in Professional Responsibility (1965-68) and the early years of the Council
on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) (1968-74).
Although the term "professional responsibility" was retained, Ford's
objective carne to be stated more frequently as providing legal "services"
to individual poor people, rather than reforming law. This change in
meaning of the terminology may have reflected movement in the direction
of professional ethics, because in 1974 CLEPR changed its emphasis
and announced that it would fund legal clinics primarily for the purpose
of providing instruction in professional ethics. 105
Whether this shift can be attributed to new insight, 106 changing times,
or strategic choice is hard to say. Beliefs in the "sensitizing" effects of
representing poor people began to look romantic as time passed and
agitation by lawyers for social reform diminished. On the other hand,
professional ethics was a long-standing and poorly taught course in the
standard curriculum, and having a better way to teach it was a firmer
foundation than social reform on which to pin one's argument for a
place in the academy. It is clear, however, that a subtle but real shift
in justification for clinical programs occurred. 107
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One might ask why it matters that Ford did not start and proceed
with a clear and consistent plan for reform of ethics instruction. If
clinical education is the most effective way to teach professional ethics,
isn't that what counts? This would, after alL not be the first time that
an agency set out to improve upon the clothesline and invented the
telephone. It mattered in this instance, however, because Ford's shifting
purposes confused legal educators. In particular, they did not know
what standards to use in deciding whom to hire to administer their
clinical prograrns.I 08
It was not clear, for example, whether clinical teachers ought to have
academic qualifications and research interests similar to those of traditional teachers, or whether law-practice experience was an appropriate
substitute. If practice experience was a substitute, should that experience
be of complex law-reform litigation, or would experience with individual
clients on small-scale, self-contained problems suffice? Should clinical
teachers be expert in professional ethics, or was it enough that they
understood strategic, lawyering technique? These and other such questions either were not answered, or were answered simplistically, confusingly, and inconsistently over time by those who spoke for Ford.I 0 9
One effect of this lack of clear and consistent direction from the
funding source was that law schools took the safest short-term but
riskiest long-term course. They hired people whose previous work
experience was closest in outward form to the day-to-day law-practice
obligations of clinical instructors. IIO Since most clinical work was done
for poor people, this meant that a high percentage of new clinical
teachers carne from the ranks of the Neighborhood Legal Service~s
Program for the poor. III
This was a safe short-term choice because these lawyers had proven
that they could successfully manage the type of lawsuit on which they
would work with students. It was a long-term risk because, with some
notable exceptionsY 2 they had not shown any critical perspective on
this representation process. They did not have law-practice research
agendas nor articulate theories of law practice. For the rnos_t part, these
lawyers/teachers had a view (often quite sophisticated) of the proper
technique of law practice, a belief that law school had not helped them
in learning this technique, and an understandable desire to pass on
what they had learned to law students. Critically examining their own
first premises, in public, against an ideaL for the purpose of understanding,
was a less familiar process. In short, many of the early clinical teachers
conceived of themselves as lawyers whose task was to practice law
jointly with law students, not as academics whose work also included
understanding and elaborating upon the nature of law practice.
Two additional characteristics of many of these early clinical teachers
contributed to the problem. The first was that many clinical teachers
did not have an articulate theory of instruction. (Some would dispute
this because it contradicts clinical teachers' own account of themselves.)

336

Robert Condlin

They were committed to the process of "learning by doing," but they
were noticeably vague about what the "doing" was supposed to involve.
Their individual theories of instruction may have been no more than
catalogues of maxims dictating avoidance of those practices they had
found unpleasant in their own legal education (e.g., teacher sarcasm,
ridicule, criticism, and impersonality). If so, their understanding of the
defects in legal education was symptomatic and may have caused them
to produce a symptomatic reform.
The second characteristic was that many clinical teachers were more
the product of their own legal education than they had realized. Without
knowing it, they had internalized the traditional law-school communication habits that they criticized and may have honed those habits in
law practice. When they returned to law schools as professors, in their
own way, they replicated these objectionable practices, substituting covert
for overt manipulative, instructional technique. Being committed to
teaching differently but not themselves being fundamentally different,
many clinical teachers altered only the outward form of legal education,
leaving its underlying substance intact.
The above factors also combined to prevent a high percentage of
clinical teachers from seeing and overcoming their initial limitations.
Not having a developed, alternative vision of law instruction, but believing
that they did possess one, clinical teachers reacted angrily to suspicion
and criticism by traditional law teachers of both CLEPR and clinical
teachers. This reaction produced what might be called a Kremlinizing
effect. Like Soviet bureaucrats, these clinical teachers divided the world
into a beleaguered "us" and a menacing "them." On this world view,
clinicians do one thing and traditional teachers do something totally ..
different. Neither group likes the other, and each avoids the other
altogether when it can. Traditional teachers hold the power in law
schools because of historical accident and use that power to perpetuate
themselves, largely by denying full faculty status to a sufficient number
of clinical teachers. Traditional teachers talk about standards, scholarship,
and intellectual content, but that is no more than an elaborate smoke
screen for what, at its root, is an unadorned power play to preserve
the dominance of the traditional law-teaching role. Some traditional
teachers are sympathetic, but they are few in number and unrepresentative
of law teachers generally. Most traditional teachers are hostile, not
because they want to be, but because they need to protect the only job
that they know how to do.
This is the world view of far too many clinical teachers. It produces
a profound intellectual and emotional insularity in those who hold it
that cuts them off from knowledge of their own limitations and makes
serious consideration of those limitations almost impossible. The fact
that much of it is overstated does not weaken its hold.m
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Two final questions must be answered. Should law schools continue to
use clinical programs to teach professional ethics? And if so, what can
be done to reduce the risk of such programs graduating unself-conscious
instrumentalists?
The first question is easy. Understanding doctrine is different from
understanding virtue. Virtue must become habit and disposition before
it can become principle, and this process takes place best in the context
of interpreted lawyer role-adjustment experiences. The alternative-analysis of hypothetical ethical dilemmas-is to the learning of
ethics what riding in ski-lifts is to the climbing of mountains: all form
and no substance. 114
But how clinical programs can avoid graduating instrumentalists is
more difficult to answer. The problems I have described are fundamental.
They evince a deep-rooted and basic failure of much of clinical instruction
to live up to its potential as a vehicle of moral education. The potential
is there, and it would be a mistake to give up on it. But reforms are
needed if the self-perpetuating and destructive patterns I have described
are to be interrupted. Unfortunately, suggesting programmatic reform
is a larger task than I can hope to address here. My recommendations
are intended only as a modest first step toward altering two conditions
that feed the problem.
The first condition is the woefully underdeveloped and one-sided
intellectual content of much clinical teaching about ethics. Too many
clinicians rely on a small stock of shopworn, persuasion-mode ideas,
and seem to be unfamiliar with learning-mode alternatives. For example,
it is inconceivable that clinical teachers with sophisticated views about
ethics could be unaware of the problems of manipulation and domination
that Wasserstrom has identified. These are watershed issues. Yet the
clinical literature, 115 and the behavior of clinical teachers I have studied,
all too often evidence only simplistic understandings of tpese issues
generally and no awareness of their manifestations in clinical teaching.
This lack of sophisticated understanding is a clinical Achilles' heel.
The only teaching ''method" that succeeds over time is the triumph of
content. The ethical content of clinical instruction needs to be criticized,
tested, and reformulated, and multiple intellectual perspectives on this
content need to emerge. 116 It cannot any longer be thought sufficient
to teach a clinical course as a series of ad hoc reactions to the ethical
issues that arise in a set of randomly (or even carefully) selected cases.
Clinical teachers drawing upon their distinctive vantage point, must
identify that core set of behaviors, concepts, theories, analytical frameworks, and insights about ethics that is the essence of their instruction,
and these elements must always be part of clinical course offerings.
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The development of this content is the responsibility of all clinical
teachers. It cannot be lek as it has in the past, to a handful of productive
and innovative thinkers. This means, most significantly, that more
individual teachers must communicate and defend their ideas in the
journals. There must be the unfettered debate from many perspectives,
some to prove mistaken, that is characteristic of the healthiest subjects
of study. If this does not occur, clinical instruction in ethics is living
on borrowed time, and the fact that the gallows is not yet built does
not change that. 117
The second and related condition is the inadequacy of clinical research
methods. Most clinical scholarship is "empirical," in that it is based on
observed clinical experiences. Yet most of those experiences are reported
in the form of authors' summaries of what students did and paraphrases
of what students said. The difficulty with this data is that a reader
cannot tell what actually happened or whether he or she would have
summarized the clinical experiences in the same way. And the wellknown distorting effects of perceptiort, memory, expectation, and intention are rarely considered. 118 That this writing is usually self-laudatory-every clinical program is described as an unmitigated success, 119
and there are no ''carefully documented failures" 120-adds to the reader's
suspicion.
Clinical teachers should reject the temptation to reminisce about a
semester. The random recalling of anecdotes is not empirical research.
More clinical teachers must begin to generate data that has a substantial
claim to objectivity. To do this, at least in the immediate future, it will
probably help to work with others trained in empirical research, forming
cross-disciplinary alliances within the university. 121 This practice should
have the added effect of breaking down the insularity, described earlier, "'
that is too frequently the hallmark of contemporary clinical study.
Better scholarship and research methods by themselves, however, are
only part of the answer. It is possible to understand and agree with
Wasserstrorn's critique, and yet still use persuasion-mode behaviors
inappropriately in one's communications with students. Even teachers
sensitive to the problem need to monitor and evaluate their communication practices on a regular basis (and many do), if those practices
are not to add a layer of distortion to their instruction about ethics.
Making teacher-student communication a conscious subject of clinical
study is the easiest way to do this.
This means that more than just a handful of clinical teachers must
study both ethics and their own teaching of ethics. On this second level,
they must identify the persuasion- and learning-mode properties of their
communication practices with one another and evaluate the appropriateness of those practices to the situations in which they arise. Ideally,
teachers and students would correct inappropriate behavior. But if that
is not possible (e.g.,. because underlying dispositions are too strong),
they must still identify the behavior for what it is, acknowledge its
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inappropriateness, and do as much as they can to meliorate or nullify
its undesirable effects.
In studying oneself teaching there is the risk, of course, that the
parasite will swallow the host. The analysis of teacher-student communication cannot be continuous or predominant. The majority of the
time in the clinic must be spent in the study of lawyering. Trying to
be actor and observer simultaneously is similar to what Bernard Williams
has described as trying to find a "mid-air position," that is, a framework
outside all frameworks. 122 It will not work. There is no such position.
But if the analysis of teacher-student communication is kept within
bounds, it blends naturally with the analysis of student-cast interaction.
The two complement and build upon one another.
In studying themselves, clinical teachers need models. This process,
like learning virtue, depends upon the development of habit as well as
the articulation of principle. This is perhaps the most difficult need to
satisfy. Self-reflective learners do not abound in law teaching, 123 and
clinicians may have to look elsewhere to find them. Fortuities excepted,
this is likely to be a slow and frustrating search. In the interim, ·clinicians
might find models in the critical literature. Some of this scholarship is
written from the perspective of the individual actor and describes critical
self-learning in graphic detail.
In the end, rational dialogue is a major part of the "good" that is
modeled in clinical instruction. And such dialogue has as necessary
preconditions the articulation of principles and the critical analysis of
the process by which those principles are articulated. I emphasize these
preconditions because I believe their neglect has done the most to
produce the persuasion-mode universe that is clinical instruction today. "
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see Robert Stevens, "Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law SchooL" in Law and
American History, edited by Bernard Bailyn and Donald Fleming (Boston: Little, Brown,
1971), pp. 410-35.
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by Howard R. Sacks (Chicago: Council on Education in Professional Responsibility, American
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appropriate antidote. See, e.g., Sacks and Kenoe, "The Counseling Training Project," pp.
42-46.
25. See also William H. Simon, "The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
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Pennsylvania Law Review 128 (1979): 73-112; David Luban, "Paternalism and the Legal
Profession," Wisconsin Law Review (1981): 1; Mark Spiegel, "The New Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision Making and the Role of Rules in Structuring
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Journal of Legal Education 22 (1969): 50; James E. Starrs, "Crossing a Pedagogical Hellespont
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years. They taught at elite as well as nonelite law schools. For a further description of
their characteristics, see "Socrates's New Clothes," p. 249 n. 66.
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of Communicative Competence," Inquiry 13 (1970): 360; Jurgen Habermas, "On Systematically Distorted Communication," Inquiry 13 (1970): 205.
62. Condlin, "Socrates's New Clothes," pp. 235-38.
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67. The self-sealing property of the persuasion mode produces this effect. By "selfsealing," I mean that people acting in the persuasion mode do not reflect critically on
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conversational style and are effective because they keep another from discovering that
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see Erving Coffman, Strategic Interaction (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1969).
76. Douglas Rosenthal has described the economic costs to the client when this
happens. RosenthaL Lawyer and Client, pp. 13-27.
77. Elizabeth Loftus has discussed the importance of conviction in argument. See
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1979), p. 19.
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model emulation is the most obvious way in which this ripening could occur. Students
could come (and some do) to their clinical experience habitually and intellectually indifferent
to the persuasion mode, and become what they do. (Robert Coles, Erik Erikson and the
Growth of His Work [Boston: Little, Brown, 1970], p. 339.) But this is rarely the case.
Almost all students have strong feelings about the substance of the persuasion mode
before they enroll in clinical programs. Most reject the mode as inappropriate in social
interaction, notwithstanding that they use it to varying degrees.
How persuasion-mode habits ripen into beliefs that drive out preexisting beliefs is a
slightly more complicated question. At least three social psychological theories have been
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Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance [Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957]) suggests
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Explanation of Dissonance Phenomenon," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74
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Experimental Social Psychology 1 (1965): 199; Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy De Camp
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through the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR). Early
in his tenure as President of CLEPR William Pincus (the principal spokesman for clinical
education; see Pincus, Clinical Education for Law Students, p. xv) stated that CLEPR was
not interested in changing the law school curriculum. See William Pincus, "Council on
Legal Education for Professional Responsibility: Past, Present and Potential Contributions,"
in Education in the Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer, edited by Donald T. Weckstein
(Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1970), p. 330. At some point Pincus
changed his mind.
"'
81. This is not to say that no educators were involved in the first clinical programs.
Obviously some were. But educators had been able to start and sustain clinical programs
on only a limited and sporadic basis. See Stevens, "Two Cheers," pp. 522-24. It took
the money of the Ford Foundation and the proselytizing of William Pincus to make clinical
education a systemwide phenomenon. It was Pincus and his allies who had objectives
other than educational reform. They were not hostile to educational reform and often
listed it in their statement of objectives. But the tenor of their public discussions would
lead one to conclude that they were more interested in other things, at least at the outset.
82. Pincus, Clinical Education for Law Students, pp. 71-72.
83. The National Council on Legal Clinics, funded from 1958 to 1965 at $800,000;
the Council on Education in Professional Responsibility, funded from 1965 to 1968 at
$900,000; and the Council. on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, funded
from 1968 to 1978 at approximately $10,000,000 total. Lester Brickman describes the
phoenix-like succession pattern of Ford's agencies. Brickman, "CLEPR and Clinical Education," pp. 56-60. See also Gee and Jackson, "Bridging the Gap/' pp. 755-61; Orison
S. Marden, "CLEPR: Origins and Programs," in Clinical Education for the Law Student,
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pp. 5-8. Ford rarely, if ever, paid all of the costs of a clinical program. Typically, it would
pay two-thirds of the program's expenses in the first year of a grant, one-third in the
second, and none after that. The formula varied greatly, but Ford's approach was always
to provide "seed money," hoping that the law schools would take over total responsibility
for the programs in short order.
84. Pincus, Clinical Education for Law Students, pp. 1-3. See also Brickman, "CLEPR
and Clinical Education," p. 65; Gee and Jackson, "Bridging the Gap," pp. 884-85; Marden,
"CLEPR," pp. 4-5; Whitney North Seymour, "CLEPR From the Viewpoint of the Practicing
Bar," in Clinical Education for the Law Student, pp. 13-15.
85. I do not intend to make the line between ethics and politics too sharp. There is
obviously a good deal of overlap. But instruction, for example, in how to make access
to the legal system available is not the same as instruction in how to avoid manipulation
and domination. Ford was more interested in the former at this time.
86. Marden, "CLEPR," p. 5.
87. Ibid., p. 6.
88. See Pincus, Clinical Education for Law Students, pp. 5-9; 24-25; 208-9. See also
Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct.
2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972).
"I join the opiJ1ion of the court and add only an observation upon its discussion of
legal resources, ante, at 12 n.7. Law students as well as practicing attorneys may provide
an important source of legal representation for the indigent. The Council on Legal Education
for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) informs us that more than 125 of the country's
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students aid clients in a variety of civil and criminal matters. [citation omitted]. These
programs supplement practice rules enacted in 38 states authorizing students to practice
law under prescribed conditions. [citation omitted]. Like the American Bar Association's
Model Student Practice Rule (1969), most of these regulations permit students to make
supervised court appearances as defense counsel in criminal cases. [citation omitted].
Given the huge increase in law school enrollments over the past years, [citation omitted],
I think it plain that law students can be looked to to n:i.ake a significant contribution,
quantitatively, and qualitatively, to the representation of the poor in many areas, including
cases reached by today's decision." Ibid., p. 540 (L. Ed.).
89. Ibid. Ford's first appropriation for clinical programs was made three months before
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) established the constitutional right to counsel
in felony cases. See Pincus, Clinical Education for Law Students, p. 8.
90. Toll, "CLEPR From the Viewpoint of Legal Aid," pp. 21-22.
91. This was also the time of the establishment of the Neighborhood Legal Services
Program for the poor. See Edgar S. Cahn and Jean Camper Cahn, "The War on Poverty:
A Civilian Perspective," Yale Law Journal 73 (1964): 1316; Edgar S. Cahn and Jean Camper
Cahn, "What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited," Notre Dame Lawyer 41
(1966): 927; "Legal Services-Past and Present," Cornell Law Review 59 (1974): 960; Roger
C. Cramton, "Promise and Reality in Legal Services," Cornell Law Review 61 (1976):
674-80; Warren E. George, "Development of the Legal Services Corporation," Cornell Law
Review 61 (1976): 687-90. Note, "Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal
Services for the Poor," Harvard Law Review 80 (1967): 805.
92. Pincus, Clinical Education for Law Students, pp. 63, 82, 160-61; Gee and Jackson,
"Bridging the Gap," pp. 884-85.
93. Stevens, "Two Cheers", pp. 539-41.
94. Stone, "Legal Education on the Couch"; Watson, "The Quest for Professional
Competence," p. 91; <;:tl.~;Jes A. Reich, "Toward the Humanistic Study of Law," Yale Law
Journal 74 (1965): 1402; Savoy;""''Towaid. a.· New Politics," p.-444";Xei1:nedy, "How the Law
5choor Fails/'--- - . --·
95. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer and Robert S. Redmount, Lawyers, Law Students and
People (Colorado Springs, Co.: Shepard's Inc., 1977), pp. 1-13, 48-53, 93-102, 153-192;
Carolyn S. Bratt, "Beyond the Law School Classroom and Clinic-A Multidisciplinary
Approach to Legal Education," New England Law Review 13 (1977): 200-205; Arthur
Kinoy, "The Present Crisis in American Legal Education," Rutgers Law Review 24 (1969):
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1; Rockwell, "The Education of the Capitalist Lawyer," p. 94; Jon Richardson, "Does
Anyone Care for More Hemlock?" Journal of Legal Education 25 (1973): 427; Anthony J.
Mohr and Kathryn J. Rodgers, "Legal Education: Some Student Reflections," Journal of
Legal Education 25 (1973): 403; Simon, "Homo Psychologicus," p. 553; Kennedy, "How
the Law School Fails," pp. 1-4. These complaints were directed at all university education,
not just law school. See Joseph J. Schwab, College Curriculum and Student Protest (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1969).
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Yale Law Journal 79 (1970): 505-11.
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Foundation Evaluation Group," in Sacks, Proceedings of the Asheville Conference, pp. 97-105.
99. I do not mean that most faculty were willing personally to experiment with new
programs. They were willing to support an institutional experiment-i.e., they would vote
to hire a clinical teacher-but few traditional faculty actually taught clinical courses. For
an exception, see Alfred F. Conard, "Letter from the Law Clinic/' Law Quadrangle Notes
18 (Fall 1973): 18.
100. Barnhizer, "The Clinical Method," pp. 73-'75.
101. For a twist on this argument, contending that it is the student-client relationship
that introduces the democratizing and personalizing element, see the statement of William
Pincus quoted in Packer and Ehrlich, New Directions in Legal Education, p. 44.
102. See Stevens, "Two Cheers," p. 528.
103. For a history of the law and economics movement, see Morton J. Horwitz, "Law.,
and Economics: Science or Politics?" Hofstra Law Review 8 (Summer 1980): 905-12. See
also Duncan Kennedy, "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique," Stanford
Law Review 33 (February 1981): 387 n. 1, 393-98.
104. See Stevens, "Two Cheers," pp. 476-77, 531-37.
105. Pincus, Clinical Education for Law Students, pp. 228-40, 271-74, 293, 296. In spite
of CLEPR's emphasis on first, law reform, and then, ethics, most clinical programs today
emphasize the teaching of interpersonal technique. CLEPR's goals weren't ignored, just
subordinated. Perhaps this is because law practice, by its nature, raises more technique
issues than it does ethical and political ones. Since technique predorri.inates and is more
manageable emotionally and intellectually, it is understandable that it would become the
focal point of clinical work. Moreover, only with respect to interpersonal technique can
clinical cases be counted on, by themselves, to raise a comprehensive and representative
set of issues. It is easy to give a complete course in interpersonal technique from practice
cases. Problems of coverage, sequence, and structure are manageable in a way that they
are not when practice work is used to teach a comprehensive course in professional ethics.
106. This shift occurred immediately after the publication (in a CLEPR-sponsored
anthology) of Gary Bellow's very influential article "On Teaching the Teachers." Bellow
argued that clinical instruction was mostly a pedagogical innovation and downplayed its
social reform potential. CLEPR may have been convinced by Bellow's reasoning and thus
decided to justify clinical instruction in terms of its pedagogical potential. The shift to a
"professional ethics" ju~tification was partly a shift in the direction of pedagogy.
107. For a slightly different version o£ the development of legal clinics, see Kelly, Legal
Ethics, pp. 17-20. Kelly suggests that CLEPR's and clinical teachers' shift from an interest
in social reform to an interest in pedagogy and professional ethics was a reaction to "the
politics of tenure."
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108. Perhaps law faculties should not have looked to CLEPR for guidance in hiring
clinical teachers. After alL who should know better than a law teacher what qualities a
law teacher ought to have? That logic did not operate, perhaps because CLEPR was paying
most of the bills and had strong feelings about what type of person should be hired (i.e.,
not a traditional law teacher); law faculties had been convinced that clinical teaching was
different in some unspecified way that made traditional academic standards inappropriate;
and law faculties thought that CLEPR's views were based on documented experience.
When no one knows what is right, the first person to speak authoritatively is often
deferred to, especially in the short term, and particularly if he's paying.
109. For the most part, the "answers" were provided by William Pincus. See note
80. For representative examples, see Pincus, Clinical Education for Law Students, pp. 140-51,
244-56, 351-57, 370-72, 376-78. I have cited only to excerpts from articles that first
appeared in academic law journals. Pincus's speeches and panel presentations provide
richer evidence of the simplicity and confusion of CLEPR's position, but few people put
their best thoughts in speeches.
110. In all fairness to law faculties, it is not clear that the pool of prospective clinical
teachers was ever rich in candidates w.ith academic interests. Law faculties may have had
little choice.
111. The Neigl;>borhood Legal Services Program (the federal government program
charged with providing legal services to the poor) had begun to produce a large class of
"burned out" lawyers, looking for new and less frustrating work. (For a discussion of
the "burn out" phenomenon, see Jack Katz, "Lawyers for the Poor in Transition: Involvement,
Reform, and the Turnover Problem in the Legal Services Program," Law & Society Review
12 [Winter 1978]: 286-97.) Since most clinical practice was done for poor people, but
under less pressured and more reflective conditions, these lawyers had a natural interest
in the mass of new clinical faculty positions being created.
112. See, e.g., Meltsner and Schrag, "Report from a CLEPR Colony"; Michael Meltsner
and Philip Schrag, "Scenes from a Clinic," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 127
(1978): 1; Jack Himmelstein, "Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry Into the Application
of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law," New York University Law
Review 53 (1978): 514; Spiegel, "The New Model Rules"; SpiegeL "Lawyering and Client
Decisionmaking"; Gary Bellow, "Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience," NLADA Briefcase (August 1977): 106.
113. Sometimes, of course, this clinical world view is accurate. Some traditional law
faculty are narrow-minded, biased, and intellectually dishonest in their dealings with
clinical programs. They try to hold clinical teachers to standards that they cannot meet
themselves and oppose clinical programs with a fanaticism and pettiness of sometimes
epic proportions. Clinical teachers sometimes have reason to be paranoid.
On the other hand, it is easy to mistake the devil for everyman. Because the fanatics
are the most voluble, it is easy to think that they are the most representative. When this
is done, there is the tendency to write off all law faculty reaction as unfair, ideologicaL
or sick. Understandable as this reaction is, it is self-defeating.
When law faculties are examined in the aggregate, the charge that they are unsympathetic
is hard to establish on the evidence. There is resistance to clinical instruction, to be sure.
But serious reforms produce resistance as a matter of course. Reformers always have to
go more than halfway. When an organization is asked to change accustomed ways of
doing things, even if outmoded, it resists. This is even more the case when the reform
introduces subjects (i.e., the study of the self and social relationships) that have a proven
capacity for mobilizing defenses, particularly in law-trained people. The resistance of law
faculties must be measured by the extent to which it goes beyond expected resistance.
Against this standard, traditional teachers look moderately sympathetic.
114. This statement admits of a limited qualification. If a person has developed moral
habits while growing up and has reflected on those habits so as to understand them in
principled terms, he or she may be able, through an act of the imagination, to place
herself or himself in the position of a lawyer confronted with an ethical choice and create
in her or his mind the intellectual and emotional conditions constitutive of that situation.
For such a person, a hypothetical ethical scenario could serve as a trigger for this
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imaginative act, and the analytical resolution of such a scenario could serve as a realistic
rehearsal for a response to the dilemma in real life. Some people are sufficiently imaginative,
and their ethical character sufficiently mature, that they can find learning in the tiniest
shards of an instructional experience and use that learning to direct their behavior in life.
Legal education ought not to mistake this person for the paradigm case.
115. The problems with the clinical literature are discussed in Simon, "Homo Psychologicus."
116. One commentator has suggested that multiple intellectual perspectives on the
technique dimension of clinical instruction have already taken shape. See Carrie MenkelMeadow, "The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About Lawyering," Cleveland State
Law Review 29 (1980): 555.
117. Eventually, students do not enroll in courses in which the intellectual content
does not evolve. As each generation of clinical students passes on more of the stock ideas
with which a clinical program deals, there will come a time when there will be few, if
any, new ideas to teach. At that time, clinical programs will lose out in the competition
for student (particularly good student) enrollment. Ronald Pipkin has described the process
through which students abandon a course without new intellectual content, using as an
example, ironically, the traditional course in professional responsibility. See Ronald Pipkin,
"Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Curricular Paradox," American
Bar Foundation Research Journal 1979 (1979): 257-65.
118. For a further discussion of these issues, see Condlin, "Socrates's New Clothes,"
p. 237 n. 35 and 251 n. 69.
119. For representative examples of such scholarship, see GeorgeS. Grossman, Clinical
Legal Education: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Council on Legal Education for
Professional Responsibility, 1974), pp. 40-55. See also any of the descriptions of particular
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Clinical Education, pp. 138-213; Sacks, Proceedings of the Asheville Conference, pp. 17-91.
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rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 21.
121. For previous examples of clinical teacher collaboration with scholars from other
disciplines, see Harrop A Freeman and Henry Weihofen, Clinical Law Training: Interviewing
and Counseling (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1972); Murray Teigh Bloom, Lawyers, Clients
and Ethics: Using the Law School Clinic for Teaching Professional Responsibility (New York:
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, 1974). For an example of the
type of empirical research that is desirable, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Allocating Legal
Resources Among Legal Services Attorneys," Proposal to the National Science Foundation,
May 28, 1980.
122. Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Harper & Row,
1972), p. 29.
123. Ironically, clinical teachers are among the most prominent of the limited number
of law teacher models. Critical self-reflection characterizes the writing of Michael Meltsner,
Phil Schrag, Jack Himmelstein, Mark Spiegel, and Gary Bellow, among others. See note
112. Traditional law teachers also provide such models. See, e.g., Paul Brest, "On My
Teaching," Stanford Lawyer (Spring/Summer 1979): 23.
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